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Subchapter S Distributions and Pseudo 
Distributions: Proposals for Revising the 
Defective Blend of Entity and 
Conduit Concepts 
GLENN E. COVEN .:. 
Subchapter S was enacted to relieve some incorporated businesses of 
the burden of double taxation that is nominally imposed upon corporate 
profits.1 If its provisions are elected, the corporation is generally ex-
empted from federal income taxes. 2 Instead, the income of the corpora-
tion is includable directly on the income tax returns of its shareholders. 3 
While this regime generally resembles the conduit approach used in 
taxing partnership income;' the original version of subchapter S in no 
sense allowed conduit taxation of corporations. While subchapter K 
largely eliminates the effect of the partnership entity upon the taxation 
of partners, subchapter S, as first enacted in 1958, used most of the 
entity concepts that fashion the taxation of non electing corporations.:~ 
Widespread dissatisfaction with subchapter S resulted in its complete 
revision in 1982.6 The objectives of the revision were to improve the 
*GLENN E. CoVEN (B.A., Swarthmore College, 1963; LLB., Columbia Uni-
versity, 1966) is Professor of Law, College of WJlliam and Mary. 
1 S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 {1958). See also J. EUSTICE & J. 
KUNTZ, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF S CoRPORATIONS ~ 1.02[3] (1982) [here-
inafter EusTICE & KUNTZ]. 
Since dividends of a nonelecting corporation are not deductible to the corpora-
tion but are taxed to the recipient, two levels of tax are imposed upon the dis-
tributed income. Closely held corporations often minimize the doubling by dis-
tributing cash to shareholders in the form of deductible payments, such as salary 
or rent, rather than dividends. 
2 I.R.C. § 1363(a). Corporations that previously were nonelecting corpora-
tions (C corporations) are taxed on some forms of income. I.R.C. §§ 58(d), 
137l(d), 1374, 1375. 
After 1986, corporations making midstream S elections are subject to far 
more extensive double taxation. See infra text following note 101. 
s I.R.C. § 1366(a). 
4 C/. I.R.C. §§ 701-02. 
5 Originally, subchapter S merely created a constructive year-end dividend of 
the taxable income of the corporation. For a discussion, see Coven & Hess, The 
Subchapter S Revision Act: An Analysis and Appraisal, 50 TENN. L. REv. 569, 
676-79 (1983). 
GPub. L. No. 97-354, 96 Stat. 1669 (1982). 
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taxation of electing corporations (now called S corporations) by con-
forming subchapter S more completely to the conduit model, and by 
eliminating the numerous flaws and unanticipated technicalities that had 
victimized so many taxpayers. 7 The revision, however, falls far short 
of extending full conduit treatment to S corporations. What emerged 
instead was a revised blend of entity and conduit concepts. Unfortu-
nately, Congress' synthesis of these concepts is not satisfactory; the blend 
does not work welL 8 Moreover, the complexity and irrationality of the 
blend was needlessly heightened in 1986. 
Not surprisingly, the provisions governing distributions to sharehold-
ers contain the least satisfactory combination of these inconsistent con-
cepts-these inconsistencies are the focus of this article. Congress' desire 
to make subchapter S freely available to previously incorporated busi-
nesses led it to permit corporations to elect subchapter S status without 
immediate tax cost.9 An election by a corporation that has operated as 
a nonelecting corporation (a C corporation) is not treated as a construc-
tive liquidation or otherwise subjected to a compensatory tax. Rather, 
the corporation's earnings and profits account, a relic of its days as a 
taxable entity/0 is preserved, 11 and distributions from the account are 
subject to double taxation as if subchapter S had not been elected.12 
Distributions of post-election earnings, in contrast, are generally not 
taxable. 13 The distribution provisions of subchapter S are thus designed 
to accommodate both entity based distributions of pre-election earnings 
and profits and conduit based tax-free distributions of post-election in-
come. In effect, within the structure of an S corporation lies a dormant 
C corporation. 
7 See, e.g., STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 98TH CoNG., 2o Ssss., 
GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE SUBCHAPTER S REVISION ACT OF 1982, at 1 
(Comm. Print 1983). 
8 Entity and conduit concepts are more successfully blended in the taxation 
of partnerships, but in a very different way. Sections 754 and 743, for example, 
allow an election in determining the effect on the basis of partnership assets of 
a sale or exchange of a partnership interest or the transfer of an interest at death. 
9 This desire was somewhat modified in 1986. Notwithstanding the tax on 
unrealized built-in gains imposed by the 1986 revision of § 1374, however, it 
remains the case that no tax is imposed at the time of the election or thereafter 
with respect to the earnings and profits of the corporation prior to an actual 
distribution. 
10 Under § 301, distributions from nonelecting corporations are taxed at ordi-
nary income rates if they are dividends within the meaning of § 316. Section 
316 defines a dividend as a distribution out of earnings and profits as defined in 
§ 312. 
llJ.R.C. § 1371(c). 
1 2 I.R.C. § 1368(c) (2). See also the text following note 47. 
t3 I.R.C. § 1368(b)(1). 
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In 1986, incident to the repeal of the so-called General Utilities doc-
trine, Congress amended section 1374 in a way that extends the concept 
of a continuing C corporation within the structure of an S corporation. 
This extension, however, is not merely an additional application of the 
pattern of treating distributions attributable to C corporation income as 
dividends out of earnings and profits. Rather, gain inherent in assets 
held when an S election takes effect is subject to double taxation when 
the gain is recognized by the S corporation. The resulting burden of 
taxation is harsher than the normal C corporation burden (where the 
second tax is deferred until shareholders receive dividends or dispose of 
their shares), and is entirely unwarranted. 
This article examines the synthesis of entity and conduit features in 
the distribution rules. The examination establishes that the use of major 
elements of entity taxation continues to cripple the S corporation. The 
pattern of taxing S corporations will remain unsatisfactory until those 
elements, which are extraneous to conduit taxation, are replaced, and 
the taxation of S corporations more nearly conformed to the taxation of 
partnerships. 
The ideal solution to the worst problems of subchapter S would be to 
require the elimination of earnings and profits as a precondition to the 
election. Nevertheless, the operation of subchapter S could be substan-
tially improved without abandoning the existing ease of entry if certain 
elements of entity taxation were eliminated. Of particular importance, 
the corporate level accounts, including the earnings and profits account, 
must be replaced with shareholder level accounts that are compatible 
with conduit taxation. 
I. SEPARATION OF STOCK AND DEBT BASIS 
The :first step in determining how distributions from conduit entities 
will be taxed is the computation of the shareholder's basis. Distributions 
that are deemed to constitute a recovery of basis will be free of tax, while 
distributions in excess of basis must be subject to tax. u Basis, of course, 
has a second crucial significance: Losses allocated to the shareholder by 
the entity may not be claimed to the extent that they exceed basis. 15 The 
computation of the basis of stock in an S corporation for the purpose of 
measuring the amount of loss that may be claimed has greatly compli-
cated the taxation of distributions. 
True conduit treatment requires that the basis of a partner or share-
holder in an S corporation correspond to the basis the investor would 
14 See I.R.C. §§ 731, 1368. 
15 See I.R.C. §§ 704(d), 1366(d)(l). 
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have obtained had he become the sole owner of the assets in his individ-
ual capacity. In the taxation of partnerships, that optimum computation 
of basis is very nearly achieved. A partner's basis for his partnership 
interest not only includes the partner's direct investment in the partner-
ship, but also a ratable share of partnership liabilities. 16 A borrowing by 
the partnership is statutorily reconstructed as a borrowing by the partners 
in the aggregate followed by a contribution of the proceeds by them to 
the partnership. As a result, the partners as a group obtain a basis for 
their partnership interest that includes the full amount of an entity level 
borrowing. 
The same result occurs when the partnership borrows from a partner. 
A partner, in his capacity as lender to the partnership, is treated as if he 
were acting in a nonpartner capacity. Thus, to the extent the other part-
ners are obligated to repay the loan, the loan is reconstructed as if it 
were made to them and then contributed to the partnership. The 
balance of the loan is treated as if made from the partner-lender to 
himself and contributed to the partnership. As a result, the basis for 
the lender's partnership interest is increased to the same extent as if the 
partnership had borrowed from an unrelated third party. A fully re-
course borrowing by a general partnership from a partner, 17 for example, 
would result in a basis increase for the partner equal to the fraction of 
the borrowed amount that corresponded to the partner's loss ratio in the 
partnership. 
The effect of this conduit approach to a partnership level borrowing is 
to give each partner a unitary basis for his partnership interest equal to 
the amount that he has agreed to place at the risk of the business. To the 
extent that the partner's loan increases the amount so at risk, a basis 
adjustment is made to his interest in the partnership. The resulting basis 
thus becomes the appropriate limitation upon the partnership losses that 
may be claimed by any partner, and, under the scheme of subchapter K, 
losses can only be claimed against that basis.18 Thus, the tax conse-
quences of all losses allocated to a partner, and of distributions from the 
partnership, are measured against a single, unitary basis. 
In the partner's capacity as creditor, he retains a full basis in his loan 
to the partnership.19 Since losses cannot be claimed against his basis in 
the loan as such, the partner's basis for his loan is not reduced by losses 
16 I.R.C. § 752(a). 
17 The allocation of the increase in basis is governed by § 1.752-1 (e) of the 
regulations, and varies depending upon whether the partner is general or limited 
and whether the loan entails personal liability. 
1s I.R.C. § 704(d). 
19 The basis of the debt remains available for other purposes such as offsetting 
gain on a sale of the security or supporting a loss if the loan is not repaid. 
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in excess of the basis for his interest in the partnership. Consequently, 
the repayment of a loan to a partnership rarely produces taxable gain. 
Rather, only transactions affecting the partnership interest produce tax 
consequences. 
Under the rules of subchapter S, an entity rather than a conduit ap-
proach determines the effects of a corporate borrowing upon the basis 
of a shareholder.:!O The borrowing of the separate corporate entity is not 
reconstructed as a shareholder borrowing and does not affect the basis 
of any shareholder. This rule has a wide variety of adverse consequences 
upon S corporations that are not of present concern. :n One corollary of 
the rule, however, is that a loan to an S corporation by a shareholder is 
not treated as a part of his or any other shareholder's contribution to 
capital. Rather, the loan is an entirely separate investment by the share-
holder in the S corporation, 22 which has its own distinct tax basis. Losses 
from the corporation can be applied against, 23 and reduce, the basis of 
either investment and, at least after 1982, income of the corporation can 
increase the basis of either security.2" Also, distributions with respect to 
either security may result in taxable gain. 
A. Effect of the Separation: Double Taxation 
Under the taxation of S corporations prior to the 1982 revision, the 
separation of the stock and debt basis caused by the entity treatment of 
a corporate level borrowing produced a series of horrifying traps for un-
suspecting shareholders. If losses were allocated to a shareholder in an 
amount that exceeded the basis for his stock, the excess nevertheless 
could be deducted to the full extent of the shareholder's basis for any 
loan to the corporation. To the extent of the losses so applied, the basis 
for the debt was reduced. 25 Income thereafter earned by the S corpora-
2° For a discussion of the entity and conduit approaches to entity debt in the 
analogous context of a limited partnership, see Coven, Limiting Losses Attribm-
able to Nonrecourse Debt: A Defense of the Traditional System Against the At-
Risk Concept, 74 CAL. L. REv. 41 (1986). 
21 Most important, an S corporation shareholder cannot claim losses attribut-
able to the expenditure of the proceeds of the corporate level borrowing. As a 
result, those shareholders may be unable to claim start-up losses in excess of 
their investment in the corporation and may be unable to obtain the tax incentive 
benefits of accelerated deductions. While under § 1366(d) (2) the disallowed 
losses may be carried forward and used in future years, the deferral of the tax 
benefit reduces its value. 
22J.R.C. § 1366(d)(1){B). 
2a I.R.C. § 1367(b)(2). 
24 I.R.C. § 1367(b)(2)(B). 
25 I.R.C. § 1376(b) (before amendment by the Subchapter S Revision Act of 
1982). 
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tion, however, did not increase the basis of that debt; only stock basis 
was increased by undistributed corporate income. 26 As a result, if the 
debt were retired, the lender would be subject to tax to the extent pay-
ments in satisfaction of the debt exceeded the reduced basis. 27 This tax 
could not be avoided, and was imposed even if the shareholder-lender 
had already been taxed on the corporate income used to pay the debt. 
Thus, the shareholder was subject to two levels of tax on an investment 
that would only be subject to a single level of tax if made through either 
a partnership or a nonelecting corporation.28 Moreover, under the 
Service's less than generous ruling policy, some tax was imposed even if 
the debt was only partially retired and the payments did not exceed the 
remaining basis in the debt. 29 Finally, for purely technical reasons, the 
tax was likely to be at ordinary income rates notwithstanding that the 
income was an artificial gain on a corporate loan.30 
B. The 1982 Solution 
The 1982 legislation addressed only the first of these hardships. To 
prevent to the maximum extent possible a double tax upon the retire-
ment of low basis debt, the Code was amended to provide that any basis 
increase attributable to corporate income shall first be made to the basis 
of any debt to the extent that basis had been reduced by allocated 
losses. 31 The long overdue permission to restore the basis of debt that 
had been eroded by losses has eliminated the double tax incurred under 
prior law on the retirement of the debt. The debt basis restoration pro-
vision of the 1982 legislation is mandatory, however,a2 and that has 
created a new, and perhaps worse, problem. 
If the basis of debt has been reduced by losses, the basis of the share-
holder-lender's stock must of necessity be zero. If, instead of using 
current income to retire shareholder debt, the S corporation makes a 
distribution on its stock, the distribution is a taxable dividend to the 
zero basis shareholder even though he is also taxed under the regular 
26 See I.R.C. § 1376(a) (before amendment by the Subchapter S Revision Act 
of 1982) (increase basis of stock, but not debt). 
27 See Cornelius v. Commissioner, 494 F.2d 465 (5th Cir. 1974). 
28 If the partner or shareholder of a nonelecting corporation actually lG>ans 
funds to the entity, the repayment will not be taxable because the lender's basis 
will not have been reduced. 
2 9 Rev. Rul. 68-537, 1968-2 C.B. 372. 
3° Cornelius v. Commissioner, 494 F.2d 465 (5th Cir. 1974). Unless the loan 
is pursuant to a "certificate or other evidence of indebtedness" within the mean-
ing of § 1275(a) (I) (A), the repayment is not treated as an exchange under 
§ 1271 (a)( 1), and thus is not eligible for capital gains taxation. 
31 I.R.C. § 1367(b){2)(B). 
32 I d. 
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pass through scheme of subchapter S on the distributed income. The 
distribution, therefore, causes precisely the same double tax on distribu-
tions on stock that occurred under prior law for distributions on debt. 
Thus, the 1982 solution merely prevented a double tax potential in one 
situation by shifting it to another. The problem created by this amend-
ment may be worse than the one solved. Since debt retirements are gen-
erally within the control of the corporation and its shareholders, the 
double tax under prior law often could be minimized or avoided by 
controlling the repayment of the debt. Omitting the payment of pro 
rata dividends until the basis of one shareholder's debt is fully restored, 
however, can be far more difficult. 
Under prior law, double taxation on the distribution of dividends did 
not occur because the basis produced by the pass through of current 
income was applied to the stock and thus sheltered the distribution from 
a second tax.33 This aspect of prior law was entirely sound. Taxing 
income as earned by the corporation and again when distributed is 
simply a technical flaw in subchapter S, and is as improper when the 
distribution is a dividend as it was when the distribution was in retire-
ment of debt. 
C. An Interim Approach 
The double tax on dividends created by the debt basis restoration 
provision could be mitigated by borrowing more heavily from the con-
cepts of entity taxation. Generally, shareholder basis under subchapter S 
is first increased or decreased by income or loss of the corporation allo-
cated to the shareholder, and distributions are tax free to the extent of 
this enhanced or diminished basis. In the taxation of partnerships,3 "' 
from which this approach was copied, the system works satisfactorily 
because partner basis is a unitary account.35 The system does not work 
in subchapter S because of the separation of basis between stock and 
debt. If the adjustment for current income or loss is not made to the 
same security on which a distribution is received, an improper double 
tax can occur. The double tax could be avoided if distributions on stock 
were always considered to come first out of current income, and only 
the excess of current income over distributions were treated as an addi-
tion to basis. The reasons for and operation of this proposal are de-
scribed more fully in the paragraphs that follow. 
Under the separation of basis mechanism, the application of losses to 
3 3 I.R.C. §§ 1376(a), 1375(d) (before amendment by the Subchapter S Re-
vision Act of 1982). 
34 Reg. § 1.704-l(d)(2). 
35 See supra text accompanying notes 16-19. 
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the basis of debt is analogous to the creation of a deficit in the stock 
basis account. When there is no remaining balance in the stock basis 
account, losses are allowed against the basis of the debt. Basis adjust-
ments for subsequent income are first applied to eliminate the stock basis 
deficit, and only when a positive balance is created can distributions on 
stock be tax free. 
In this respect, the stock basis account in an S corporation is analogous 
to the earnings and profits account of a C corporation. A distribution to 
shareholders of a C corporation is a taxable dividend only to the extent 
of the corporation's earnings and profits.36 Should there be a deficit in 
the earnings and profits, distributions are not taxable as dividends until 
income of the corporation restores the deficit. If the earnings and profits 
account were a single cumulative account, such as the basis of an S 
corporation appears to be, a C corporation with current income, but an 
accumulated deficit, could distribute the income to its shareholders free 
of tax. As long as the income did not fully restore the deficit, the distri-
bution would be a return of capital even if it was made from current 
earnings. 
This result is prevented by dividing earnings and profits into two cate-
gories: current and accumulated.37 Current income is reflected in a cur-
rent account, against which distributions are first applied. Distributions 
thus are fully taxable to the extent of current earnings and profits even 
if there is a deficit in accumulated earnings and profits that exceeds the 
positive balance in the current account. 38 Any balance remaining in the 
current account at year end is added to the accumulated account. 
The distinction between current and accumulated earnings and profits 
reflects a similar state law concept. Under traditional corporate law, 
a dividend distribution is lawful only if supported by retained earnings. 30 
In most jurisdictions, however, dividends may be distributed from current 
earnings even if a deficit exists in the historic retained earnings ac-
count. 40 Such a dividend is commonly called a nimble dividend because 
the corporate officials must act quickly to catch it. Subchapter S requires 
the addition of a nimble dividend concept. 
Such an approach could be implemented as follows: Current income 
of an S corporation would create a current basis account against 
which distributions would first be applied. If distributions exceeded the 
current basis account, the taxation of the excess would be determined by 
36 I.R.C. § 301(c)(l). 
37 I.R.C. § 316(a)(l), (2). 
3 8 See B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL 1NCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS 
AND SHAREHOLDERS 1j 7.02 (4th Ed. 1979) [hereinafter BITTKER & EUSTICE]. 
39 See, e.g., DEL. CoDE ANN.§ 170 (1982). 
4 0 ld. See also B. MANNING, LEGAL CAPITAL 77 (2d Ed. 1981). 
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the normal stock basis account. Conversely, if distributions were less 
than the current basis account, the balance remaining in the account 
would be added to the accumulated basis account as under present law. 
If a shareholder's stock basis were zero and his debt basis had been 
reduced by losses, a distribution on the stock would thus not be taxable 
unless it exceeded current income. As a result, the double tax created 
by present law would be eliminated. If, on the other hand, the corpora-
tion retired a shareholder loan instead of distributing a dividend, the 
payment would not deplete the current basis account, which would there-
fore be added to the normal basis account at year end. Under the debt 
basis restoration rules, this addition would go first to the debt, to the 
extent of debt basis previously consumed by loss deductions, and thus 
would offset any gain that might otherwise have been recognized on 
retirement of the debt. 
In effect, a nimble dividend rule for S corporations would give share-
holder-lenders the option of choosing between a tax-free dividend or a 
tax-free debt retirement, a choice that would offend no principle of tax 
policy. The double taxation of current income under the present rules 
is an unintended result of the entity treatment of debt in an S corporation. 
A mechanism for avoiding that result is entirely consistent with the 
basic notions underlying conduit taxation. 
D. Toward an Ultimate Solution 
Borrowing more heavily from entity concepts to resolve the double 
tax problem works because the problem is created by entity concepts. 
The ultimate solution to the inadequacies in subchapter S, however, re-
quires just the opposite, a fuller adoption of conduit principles. 
There is no structural reason why the basis of stock in an S corporation 
cannot be adjusted to reflect liabilities of the entity, as is done for part-
ners' bases by section 752. The mechanism for computing basis adjust-
ments for S corporation stock was copied almost intact from the 
partnership rules, and the addition of an analogue to section 7 52 poses 
no technical difficulties. 
That conclusion is not altered by the ability to move between S and C 
corporation status. When a C corporation makes an S election, an 
allocable share of the corporation's debt could be added to the basis of 
each shareholder's stock. The corporation would be treated as having 
discharged its debt when the election took effect, while the shareholders 
borrowed an equivalent amount and contributed it to the corporation. 
Conversely, the termination of an S election would be treated as if the 
corporation had distributed to its shareholders an amount equal to their 
share of the corporate debt on the day of the termination. If the debt 
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exceeded the basis of the shareholder's stock, the excess would be subject 
to tax in the same manner as an actual distribution. The tax on the 
constructive distribution would be entirely appropriate because it would 
represent a recapture of an excess of corporate deductions allocated to 
shareholders over the shareholder's equity investment. Adoption of the 
partnership basis rule for S corporations would permit the computation 
of a unitary basis and eliminate the problem of double taxation in the 
most rational manner. 
It might be objected that S corporation liabilities should not be in-
cluded in shareholders' bases because shareholders have no personal 
obligation to repay corporate debtY The limited liability of corporate 
shareholders, however, is not a sound basis for differentiating between 
partnerships and S corporations. The economic positions of a share-
holder and a partner of a partnership having nonrecourse debt are not 
distinguishable; neither has personal liability. Nevertheless, the partner's 
basis includes a portion of the nonrecourse debt. Arguably, the error 
is in the treatment of nonrecourse partnership debt, not the treatmen~ 
of S corporation liabilities. The widely differing treatment of these eco-
nomically comparable forms of investments, however, is not justi-
fiable. 
Furthermore, since the practical effect of the subchapter S basis rule 
is to deny to shareholders the benefit of accelerated deductions that 
frequently are not accompanied by economic loss, the absence of per-
sonal liability seems immaterial.42 In practice, the question is not so 
much whether deductions for tax losses not accompanied by economic 
loss are proper, but whether S shareholders should be denied the tax 
incentives of accelerated deductions that are available to partners and 
individual investors. 
Moreover, it is often untrue that a shareholder is not exposed to per-
sonal liability in the same manner as is a general partner. S corporations 
tend to be small, closely held corporations, and their major creditors 
41 That objection, of course, underlies the at risk limitations on deductions 
imposed by § 465. See H.R. REP. No. 426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 292 (1985) 
(proposing an extension of those rules to real property). The Supreme Court has 
recently indicated some sympathy for the view that a nonrecourse debt should 
not be added to the basis of property. See Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 
308 n.5, 309 n.7 (1983). 
42 The objection to claiming losses against a basis that includes the amount of 
nonrecourse debt is largely based on the assumption that tax losses reflect eco-
nomic losses and that, because of those economic losses, the value of the security 
will be insufficient to repay the loan. In fact, however, tax losses often reflect 
accelerated deductions granted as tax incentives by such provisions as § 168 and 
are not accompanied by economic losses. Thus, the tax losses do not imply that 
the loan will not be repaid. 
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frequently require personal guarantees from their shareholders. A 
guaranteeing shareholder is exposed to personal liability in a manner 
that is not meaningfully different from the liability of a shareholder who 
invests borrowed funds in the corporation. The shareholder thus should 
be allowed deductions for corporate losses to the extent of his personal 
obligation.43 Throughout the history of subchapter S, shareholders have 
asserted that one or another configuration of shareholder guarantee 
should be sufficient to increase the basis of S corporation stock. In 
recognition, perhaps, of the merits of the argument, both the Commis-
sioner 44 and the courts 45 occasionally agreed. Expressly permitting the 
adjustment of stock basis for entity level liabilities thus would not change 
present law as greatly as might be thought. In any event, adoption of 
the partnership rule would have the collateral benefit of concluding the 
continuing and unproductive litigation over S corporation shareholder 
guarantees. 
Finally, the addition of entity debt to a shareholder's basis is not the 
equivalent of permitting the shareholder to claim losses in excess of his 
investment. In practice, the ability of a limited partner to deduct losses 
against a basis created by a nonrecourse borrowing is limited by the 
at risk and passive activity loss rules." 11 While there is some question as 
to the need or desirability of the at risk limitations,47 those rules can be 
43 In partnership taxation, the effect of partner guarantees upon basis is very 
different from their effect on an S corporation. All debt is added to the bases 
of partners' interests; the only issue is how the basis increase is to be allocated. 
In subchapter S, the issue is whether any basis increase is allowable. In partner-
ship taxation, the rules governing the allocation are in transition. The position 
of the Commissioner has been ambivalent. Compare Block v. Commissioner, 41 
T.C.M. (CCH) 546 (1980), with Raphan v. United States, 3 Ct. Cl. 457 (1983), 
rev'd, 759 F.2d 879 (Fed. Cir. 1985). However, Congress has instructed the 
Treasury Department to issue revised regulations on the issue that presumably 
will take partner guarantees into account in the allocation of basis. Pub. L No. 
98-369, § 79(a), 98 Stat. 4494 (1983). 
44 In Revenue Ruling 75-144, 1975-1 C.B. 277, a shareholder converted a 
guaranteed loan to an S corporation into a loan to himself by substituting his note 
for the corporate note with the lender. The S corporation thereupon became 
liable to the shareholder for that amount. The Commissioner ruled that the share-
holder thereby obtained a basis for claiming losses in the amount of the corpo-
rate debt to him. Whatever commercial law distinctions attach to this conversion, 
the economic position of the shareholder was wholly unchanged. 
45 Selfe v. United States, 778 F.2d 769 (11th Cir. 1985) (guaranteed loan to 
thinly capitalized corporation treated as loan to shareholder plus contribution to 
corporation, which created basis). Compare Bader v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 
1987-30. 
46 I.R.C. §§ 465, 469. 
47 See Coven, Limiting Losses Attributable to Nonrecourse Debt: A Defense 
of the Traditional System Against tlze At-Risk Concept, 74 CAL. L. REv. 41, 
62-79 (1986). 
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applied to S corporation shareholders in the same manner as they are 
applied to partners. 48 The rationality of the Code would be improved 
by restricting the deductibility of partnership and S corporation losses 
in the same way. 
JI. DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN SAND C EARNINGS 
A C corporation can elect to be an S corporation without triggering 
any immediate tax consequence to itself or its shareholders. The priv-
ilege of switching tax free from subchapter C to subchapter S is the root 
of most of the complexity and inadequacy of subchapter S. In providing 
ease of entry, Congress' intention was not to forgive the second tax on 
prior earnings and profits, but to defer that tax until the earnings are 
distributed. 49 Thus, it became necessary for S corporations to maintain 
earnings and profits accounts. It also became necessary to develop 
tracing rules for distinguishing distributions of earnings and profits from 
distributions of income earned while the S election is in effect. The gen-
eral principle for making that distinction adopted in the original legisla-
tion and continued in 1982 is simple and straightforward: Distributions 
are deemed to come first from income recognized under the S election, 
and are traced to earnings and profits only when S period income is 
exhausted. The implementation of that principle, however, has been any-
thing but straightforward. 
A threshold issue in the application of the distinction is the question 
of whose subchapter S income must be exhausted before earnings and 
profits are reached. Earnings and profits constitute a corporate level 
account. Under the entity approach to the taxation of C corporations, 
that account represents income on which the corporation has been taxed, 
but which has not been allocated to particular shareholders. Indeed, 
there is no connection between the account and the particular share-
holders. A distribution of earnings and profits is taxed as a dividend, for 
example, even if the shareholder receiving it acquired his stock after 
the earnings and profits were accumulated. 50 
An S corporation's income is different. It is immediately allocated to, 
and taxed to, particular shareholders. :n Each shareholder's basis is 
increased by the amount of the income taxed to him, and the amount 
the shareholder is entitled to withdraw from the corporation free of tax 
48 Actually, the at risk rules are applied to shareholders of S corporations to-
day in the same manner as they are applied to partners. The distinction is in the 
nature of the debt that becomes subject to those rules. 
49 See S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1958), reprinted in 1958-3 
C.B. 922, 1009, 1140, 1146. 
5° See BITTKER & EusTICE, supra note 38, at ~ 7.01. 
6 1 I.R.C. § 1366. 
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rises in like amount. 52 These mechanics effectively treat the parties as 
though the corporation had distributed its income to the shareholders 
and the shareholders had immediately returned it to the corporation as 
capital contributions. The shareholder is entitled to a return of that 
amount free of tax before distributions are treated as attributable to the 
corporate earnings and profits. ua 
Presumably because of the connection between the accumulated in-
come of an S corporation and particular shareholders, the original 
version of subchapter S accounted for accumulated S income in individ-
ual shareholder accounts.54 The income taxed to the shareholder, and 
not distributed, was maintained in a "previously taxed income" account 
that was personal to the shareholder. The account represented a portion 
of the shareholder's stock basis that he was entitled to recover before 
distributions were treated as out of the accumulated earnings and profits 
of the corporation. 
That original mechanism for distinguishing between distributions of 
S income and earnings and profits was uniformly criticized.:;:; It was 
exceedingly difficult to obtain tax-free distributions from the previously 
taxed income account, and this greatly impaired the usefulness of an S 
election (or so it was repeatedly said). The criticisms, however, 
were not addressed to the inherent nature of a shareholder level account 
but rather to the manner in which the concept was implemented.110 
Nevertheless, the 1982 revisions of subchapter S made the previously 
taxed income account a corporate level account. 
One of the primary objectives of the 1982 legislation was to conform 
the taxation of S corporations more closely to the conduit based system 
52 I.R.C. § 1367. 
53 I.R.C. § 1368(c). 
54 Pub. L. No. 85-866, § 64(a), 72 Stat. 1606, 1655 (1958) (enacting 
§ 1375(d) (repealed 1982) ). Under§ 1379(c), the former version of§ 1375(d) 
continues to apply to distributions of S corporation income accumulated prior 
to 1983. Thus, in addition to the problems discussed in the text, regulations must 
be promulgated to describe how to integrate distributions from the corporate 
level post-1982 income account with distributions from these pre-1983 share-
holder level accounts. The scheme currently adopted by the Service is to not 
treat distributions as dividends until the AAA and the recipient shareholder's 
previously taxed income account (PTI) has been exhausted. See I.R.S. Pub. No. 
589, Tax Information on S Corporations 12 (1985), which provides: "The dis-
tribution from PTI, comes after a nontaxable distribution from AAA and before 
a dividend distribution from earnings and profits." 
55 For a discussion of the problems, see EUSTICE & KUNTZ, supra note 1, at 
~ 9.01[1]. 
56 The objectionable features of prior law included the following: The dis-
tribution had to be in cash (corporate notes in particular would not suffice), the 
distribution had to be prior to the termination of the election (even if the termi-
nation were unintended and retroactive), the account was not transferable (even 
to a donee), and current earnings and profits had to be actually distributed first. 
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of taxing partnerships. In the computation and allocation of income, 
that objective was largely achieved. The shift to a corporate level 
account for identifying S income, however, was a step in the opposite 
direction, a nod in the direction of entity taxation. The inconsistency 
appears not to have been a wise choice. 
The fundamental distinction between corporate and shareholder level 
accounts lies in the connection between the accumulated S income and 
particular shareholders. Under the corporate level accounting used for 
earnings and profits, and now used for S income, no such connection 
exists. As a result, distributions from the account need not be made to 
the shareholder to whom the income that produced the account was 
taxed but rather may be shifted among shareholders, sometimes to their 
regret and sometimes to their pleasure. That feature of the 1982 solution 
produces endless difficulties. 
A. Corporate Level Account 
Under the scheme for taxing distributions contained in section 1368, 
all S corporations having earnings and profits are required to maintain 
a corporate level account called the accumulated adjustments account, 
the AAA.57 With a few statutory exceptions,58 the AAA is computed 
under the same principles used in the computation of basis. no Thus, the 
account consists of the net income of the corporation earned after 1982, 
less the amount of all distributions from the account, that is, tax-free 
distributions. That the account should mirror the computation of basis 
is entirely correct because the account is measuring at the corporate level 
the same accumulations of income that produce an increase in basis. 
In a simple case, the AAA should equal the aggregate basis increases for 
all shareholders after 1982. 
Section 1368 seeks to distinguish between distributions of earnings and 
57 Although neither the Code nor I.R.S. Publication 589 (supra note 54, at 
11) requires an S Corporation to maintain an AAA when the corporation has no 
earnings and profits, the Instructions for Form 1120S (at page 11) specifically 
provide that an S Corporation must maintain an AAA regardless of whether the 
corporation has accumulated earnings and profits. 
58 Unlike basis, losses may cause the AAA to become negative. I.R.C. 
§ 1368(e)(l) (A); IRS Pub. No. 589, supra note 54, at 12. Thus, the corpora-
tion must derive income equal to the amount of such losses before further tax-
free distributions can be made. While the AAA is not necessarily related to the 
separation of basis problem considered above, the concept of a negative AAA is 
inconsistent with the suggestion of a nimble dividend approach for subchapter S. 
The second difference between the AAA and basis computation is that tax-
exempt income (municipal bond interest exempt under § 103(a), for example) 
does not increase the AAA. I.R.C. § 1368(e)(l)(A). As a result, the corpora-
tion cannot distribute this income before distributing all of its earnings and 
profits. This rather harsh treatment of tax-exempt income may not be justifiable. 
uo I.R.C. § 1368(e) (1) (:A). 
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profits and of AAA through a three tier system. The first tier consists 
of all distributions that do "not exceed the accumulated adjustments 
account." Thus, the principle is established, or so it seems, that the 
post-1982 S income is the source of all distributions from the corpora-
tion until the accumulated income is exhausted. Distributions in excess 
of the AAA are second tier distributions and are regarded as attributable 
to the accumulated earnings and profits of the corporation. Further 
(third tier) distributions represent a return of basis and thereafter a 
capital gain-exactly as would a distribution in excess of earnings and 
profits from a nonelecting corporation. 00 
B. Discontinuity Between Shareholder Basis and AAA 
On simple facts, the scheme of section 1368 works simply and ration-
ally. When the portion of the AAA distributed to a shareholder does not 
exceed the basis for his stock, the definition of the first tier distribution 
is unambiguous, and the line between the AAA and earnings and profits 
is understandable. The essential flaw in the corporate level account ap-
pears when a shareholder's proportionate interest in the AAA exceeds 
basis. Because each shareholder has a proportionate interest in the AAA. 
regardless of how the basis of his shares is determined, that discontinuity 
can arise in a variety of ways. If an S corporation with a substantial 
AAA account issues stock in a tax-free section 351 exchange, for 
example, the shareholder's basis for the stock received in the exchange 
(which equals the basis of the property he transferred in exchange) may 
be much smaller than his share of the AAA account.'n Similarly, a 
dividend that is not pro rata may reduce or eliminate the basis of a 
shareholder's stock while his interest in the AAA will correspond to his 
remaining stockholdings. 
The authors of section 1368 anticipated such discontinuities, and 
provided a seemingly appropriate response. First tier distributions 
(those not exceeding the AAA) are free of tax to a shareholder only to 
the extent they do not exceed stock basis. Any excess is treated as gain 
from the sale of the stock, a capital gain.0 :! Although the Code is some-
what vague on the point, the AAA is only reduced by the portion of the 
first tier distribution that is in fact free of tax, and not by the portion 
that is taxed as gain. 03 
60 I.R.C. § 1368(c). 
Gl For an extreme example, the transfer of properties to the corporation sub-
ject to liabilities in excess of the tax basis of the properties results in a zero basis 
for the stock or debt received. I.R.C. §§ 357(c), 358(d). 
62 Section 1368(b) (2) provides that the gain is treated as gain from the sale 
of property. Presumably, the property is the stock in the S corporation. 
63 This is apparently the result because the AAA is computed in a manner 
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The taxation of S income therefore is not entirely controlled by a 
corporate level account. Unlike the treatment of the earnings and profits 
account, where all distributions are treated as from the account even if 
they exceed the shareholder's proportionate interest in the corporation, 
an S shareholder cannot receive tax-free distributions from the account 
that exceed his basis, so that basis is an upper limit on what the share-
holder is entitled to receive free of tax. 64 There is no other acceptable 
result; shareholders cannot be permitted to receive tax-free distributions 
in excess of their investments. Nevertheless, the concurrent application 
of two dissimilar limitations upon distributions from the AAA creates a 
wholly irrational gap in the line between AAA and earnings and profits. 
Not too surprisingly, the tax effect of that gap is wholly unresolved. 
The problem is best understood by an illustration. Essco is an old S 
corporation with $200 of earnings and profits accumulated while it was 
a C corporation and an AAA of $300. It has two equal shareholders: 
AI, who has a basis of $125 for his stock, and Bee, who has a basis of 
$1,000 for her stock. 65 A distribution of $100 to each poses no difficul-
ties because it does not exceed A/'s tax-free entitlement; the distribution 
is a nontaxable first tier distribution, the basis of each shareholder's 
stock is reduced by $100, and the AAA is reduced by $200. 
A distribution of $175 to each, however, creates monumental prob-
lems. Only $125 of the distribution to AI is free of tax; the balance of 
$50 is taxed as a capital gain. Accordingly, the AAA is only reduced by 
$125 by virtue of the $17 5 distribution to him, and the remaining $17 5 
of the account fully covers the $175 distributed to Bee. The first tier 
distribution amounts to $350, notwithstanding that the AAA was only 
$300, because $50 of the distribution to AI does not diminish the ac-
count. Somewhat perversely, the lower A/'s basis, the larger the first tier 
becomes. Had A/'s basis been zero so that none of the distributions to 
him would have reduced the AAA, that account would not have been 
exhausted until $600 had been distributed pro rata to the two share-
holders. 
On these facts, the use of the corporate level account does not increase 
similar to basis and basis is reduced only by tax-free distributions under 
§ 1367(a)(2)(A). 
64 A shareholder may be entitled to receive more than his share of the AAA 
because a distribution is treated as attributable to the AAA to the full extent of 
the shareholder's basis, even if only a portion of that basis is attributable to the 
accumulation of S income. That excessive receipt of AAA has no effect upon the 
shareholder but may deprive the other shareholders of the tax-free distributions 
to which they are entitled. 
65 For those who like to understand the context, assume that the corporation 
was owned by Bee, and, in order to allow the corporation to expand, Bee con-
tributed cash and AI contributed low basis property to the corporation in a trans-
action that qualified under § 351. 
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the amount that can be distributed free of tax, but rather defers the point 
at which a distribution is treated as a second tier distribution of earnings 
and profits. The lack of congruence between the corporate and share-
holder accounts inserts a gap between the distribution of S income qnd 
of earnings and profits that has no theoretical justification. It is simply 
not logical to permit AI to realize a portion of the gain in his stock in an 
ordinary, pro rata distribution before being taxed on earnings and profits. 
The deferral of the second tier distribution can be greatly expanded. 
Assume the corporation distributes $1,000 to AI in a redemption of a 
portion of his stock. Assume, further, that the redemption is not 
treated as a sale under section 302, but rather as an ordinary dividend. 
Because the distribution cannot reduce the AAA by more than the $125 
basis of Afs stock, the account cannot be reduced below $175. Thus, 
the entire amount of the dividend is a first tier distribution, and none 
of it is treated as a distribution of earnings and profits. 
A second effect of the corporate level account is to shift the benefit 
of the AAA to Bee. On the facts of the example, that shift may not 
appear improper. Given Afs low stock basis, he is plainly not entitled to 
distribution from the AAA in excess of $125. Bee's entitlement, how-
ever, may be no greater than Afs. Both the earnings and profits and the 
AAA of Essco may have been accumulated before either of them ac-
quired their stock. If, for example, Bee had purchased all of the previ-
ously outstanding stock of Essco when she and AI acquired stock by a 
section 351 exchange, the two shareholders would have equal claims on 
the AAA, and the shift of the account to Bee would be traceable to 
nothing other than her higher basis. This shift of the AAA is particularly 
odd in light of the rules preserving the shareholder's ratable interests in 
the earnings and profits account since neither shareholder has any 
logical connection to either account. 
There is an alternative interpretation of the definition of the first tier 
distribution that would avoid both of these objections to the corporate 
level account. That interpretation, however, would introduce other 
problems and, on balance, is inferior. Under the alternative interpreta-
tion, the portion of a distribution deemed to come from the AAA would 
be limited to the amount of the AAA. In the example, this interpretation 
would limit the first tier distribution to $300. Of the $175 distributed 
to AI, $125 would be free of tax as before, but only $25 would be taxed 
as a capital gain. The balance of $25 would be a second tier distribution 
of earnings and profits, taxed as ordinary income. Similarly, only $150 
of the distribution to Bee would be free of tax, and $25 would be a 
second tier distribution. Under this interpretation, the second tier 
distribution would not be deferred, and the shift of AAA to Bee would 
be limited. 
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Immediately after the distribution, however, the corporation would 
still have an AAA of $25. The alternative interpretation thus would 
provide a second tier distribution of earnings and profits before post-
1982 S income had been fully distributed, a result inconsistent with 
section 1368. Furthermore, that interpretation would create rewards 
for the well advised and traps for the unwary of the type that the 
1982 revision was intended to eliminate. 
If the parties had been better advised, for example, they might have 
limited the distribution to a total of $300, thus avoiding any second 
tier distribution. In the following year, a further distribution of $25 
(the remaining balance in the AAA) might be made. Even if there 
is no addition to the account for this year, the distribution would be a 
first tier distribution. Only the $12.50 distributed to Bee would reduce 
the AAA. Because AI has no remaining basis, the amount he receives 
would be a taxable first tier distribution, and would not reduce AAA. In 
the third year, an AAA account of at least $12.50 would remain, and 
the process could be repeated at one half the size of the second year's 
distribution. 
In short, by employing some care in the timing of distributions, second 
tier distributions could still be avoided under this interpretation not-
withstanding that a great deal more than $300 has been distributed by 
the corporation. Because of its theoretical and practical improprieties, 
this interpretation of section 1368 seems no better, and perhaps worse, 
than the first interpretation. 
It is difficult to see how section 1368 could be revised to produce a 
sound result while saving the notion of a corporate level account. The 
gap between the first and second tier distributions could be eliminated by 
defining the first tier distribution as the lesser, rather than the greater, 
of the AAA or the respective shareholder's bases. That shift towards a 
shareholder level account, however, would leave little significance to the 
corporate level account other than to permit the shifting of the benefits 
of the account, the subject of the following section. It would be prefer-
able to abandon the AAA altogether. 
C. Shifting the Benefits of the AAA 
Because a corporate level account is not connected to any partieular 
shareholder, its benefits can be shifted from one shareholder to another 
with great freedom. As a result, the adoption of the corporate level AAA 
has created marvelous opportunities to abuse subchapter S--as well as 
dangers of self abuse. 
As developed below, there is little reason to object to a transfer of 
the benefits of the AAA incident to a transfer of stock, the circumstance 
in which Congress intended the benefits of the AAA to be transferable. 
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In fact, it would be unduly harsh not to permit a donee the same rights 
of tax-free withdrawal of funds that were held by the donor. In some 
situations, however, the transfer of the AAA to a purchaser can create 
serious traps for the parties that bring into question the very notion of 
transferability. 
In a further dubious adherence to the principles of entity taxation, 
subchapter S contains no concept of change in ownership. tHJ A purchaser 
of a controlling interest in an S corporation stands in essentially the 
same relationship to the corporation as did the sellers. 67 Whatever AAA 
exists on the date of the purchase is fully available for withdrawal by 
the purchaser. In addition, the AAA, like earnings and profits (another 
corporate level account), is adjusted at year end, and is allocated rata-
bly over all distributions during the year.68 In combination, these at-
tributes of the AAA can produce unacceptable consequences for a 
midyear sale of a controlling interest in an S corporation. 
Commonly, a seller of stock of an S corporation withdraws from the 
corporation the entire amount of the AAA in anticipation of the sale, 
thereby reducing the amount the purchaser must borrow to make the 
purchase and placing tangible property in the hands of the seller. 
Nothing prevents the purchaser, however, from also withdrawing an 
equivalent amount immediately after the purchase. Should he do so, the 
AAA, determined at the end of the year, will be allocated ratably over 
both distributions. The seller will discover that instead of receiving a 
wholly tax-free first tier distribution, one half of his distribution exceeded 
the AAA, and thus was a fully taxable second tier distribution of earn-
ings and profits. The purchaser will face the same tax burden, and that 
reality may discourage raiding AAA distributions notwithstanding the 
benefit from causing a distribution of earnings and profits to the un-
suspecting seller. The point is that the statute is flawed in permitting 
such manipulations to occur. 
A potentially more serious trap exists on the issuance of stock in an S 
corporation. The original issuance of stock in a corporation having an 
AAA causes a dilution of the account relative to the existing sharehold-
ers. If the number of shares outstanding is doubled, for example, the 
amount that can be distributed pro rata to each shareholder as a tax-free 
first tier distribution is halved. As a result, S corporations may be dis-
couraged from raising needed additional capital through stock sales. 
Such a disincentive is a regrettable interference with market activity. 
66 Compare the rule for partnerships in § 708(b) (1) (sale of 50% interest in 
partnership terminates the partnership). 
G7 Other faults in this adherence to the separate entity concept arc noted in 
Coven, Making Subchapter S Work, 32 TAX NoTES 271 (1986). 
Gs I.R.C. § 1368(c). 
400 TAX LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42: 
The ability to shift the benefits of the corporation level account, how-
ever, has created more than just traps for the ill-advised. The ability to 
benefit from that feature is even more dramatic. The very nature of a 
corporate level account allows the account to be attributed to the first 
shareholder in time to receive distributions from the corporation. Ordi-
narily, corporate distributions are pro rata and thus do not permit the 
shifting of the benefits of a corporate level account. When distributions 
are not pro rata, they normally are stock redemptions taxable as a sale 
under section 302(a).69 A distribution in redemption of stock carries 
with it a fraction of the AAA equal to the proportion of the stock re-
tired.70 Again, the ability to shift the benefits of the AAA is curtailed. 
But, nonredeeming distributions do not have to be pro rata, and redemp-
tions do not always qualify under section 302(a). In those situations, a 
substantial shift in benefits may occur. 
To illustrate how the corporate level AAA may be used to insulate 
redemptions from dividend treatment, consider a family owned C cor-
poration with ample earnings and profits. An older, high bracket share-
holder, who owns 20% of the stock, wishes to retire, but it is unclear 
whether the redemption of his stock would qualify for sale treatment 
under section 302 (a). If the corporation elects under subchapter S, its 
income will be taxed to the various family members, some of whom are 
in lower tax brackets. That income need not be distributed to them but 
can instead be paid to the retiring shareholder over a period of years in 
redemption of a portion of his stock. In the unlikely event that the 
transaction does qualify under section 302,71 the retiring shareholder 
will be entitled to capital gains taxation and the AAA will be little 
affected. If the redemption does not qualify, the shareholder will still be 
a9 Under § 302, stock redemptions are taxed as sales of the stock if the trans-
action meets one of four tests designed to insure that the redemption is not the 
equivalent of a dividend. In closely held corporations, the most important of 
these tests is the complete termination of interest rule of § 302(b) (3). If none 
of the tests of § 302(b) is met, the redemption is treated as a dividend. I.R.C. 
§ 302(d). 
70 I.R.C. § 1368(e)(l)(B). In what appears to be an oversight, this section 
does not limit the reduction in AAA to the basis of the stock redeemed. Thus, 
on the redemption of low basis stock, the AAA will be reduced by an amount 
that exceeds the tax-free distribution to the shareholder, a seemingly improper 
result. 
71 Periodic redemptions rarely survive the tests of § 302, particularly in family 
owned corporations, because they do not result in sufficient changes in pro-
portionate interest after the application of the stock attribution rules. See I.R.C. 
§ 302(b) (2), (c). A further advantage of electing subchapter S status in antici-
pation of a redemption is that periodic redemptions will not produce dividend 
treatment. 
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entitled to capital gains treatment as long as the distribution to him in 
any year does not exceed the entire balance in the AAA. 
Assume that the shareholder's basis for his stock is $1 ,000 and that 
in each year the corporation adds $800 to its AAA. Under section 1368, 
an $800 distribution to the shareholder in the first year is an entirely 
tax-free first tier distribution, and eliminates the AAA. If, in the second 
year, a distribution is again made equal to the $800 AAA accumulated 
in that year, $200 (the remaining basis) will be free of tax, and $600 
will be a capital gain.72 The AAA will only be reduced by $200, how-
ever, and thus will remain at $600. By the end of the third year, the 
AAA will increase to $1,400, and that amount may be distributed to the 
shareholder as a first tier distribution. 73 By transferring the entire benefit 
of the AAA to the retiring shareholder, all of his stock can be retired at 
capital gains rates in a relatively brief period of time-contrary to the 
structure of the corporate tax. 
It is not even necessary for the other shareholders to entirely forgo 
current distributions from the corporation in order to maximize the 
benefits to the retiring family member. An S corporation can elect in 
any year to bypass the first tier of the distribution scheme. H Thus, in 
any year, the redemption could be withheld and dividends distributed to 
all shareholders which, if the corporation so elected, would be treated as 
taxable second tier distributions. That result, however, is no worse than 
if subchapter S had not been elected, and it preserves the entire AAA for 
the retiring shareholder. 
Quite likely other more sophisticated or more subtle risks or benefits 
lurk in the ability to shift the corporate level AAA, but further explora-
tion seems unnecessary. Accumulated S income, having been taxed to 
specific shareholders, belongs in shareholder level accounts attached to 
specific shares of stock and does not belong in a corporate level account. 
The creation of that account was misguided and has impaired, rather 
than promoted, the rationality of subchapter S. 
7!! In fact, a greater amount of the distribution would be free of tax because 
the basis increase for current income would attach, in part, to the shareholder's 
remaining stock. For purposes of this illustration, that effect is ignored. 
73 The example in the text is conservative in its assumption that the first tier 
distribution is limited to the amount of the AAA. If the first interpretation of the 
first tier set forth in the text controls, any amount could be distributed in the 
second year without becoming a second tier distribution. Since the AAA could 
not be reduced by more than the $200 remaining basis for the stock, no amount 
of distributions would exhaust the account. 
74 I.R.C. § 1368(e)(3). The election to treat distributions as coming first 
from earnings and profits was intended to facilitate elimination of that account. 
It is not clear why an actual distribution is required rather than a consent 
dividend. 
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D. The Real Culprits: Earnings and Profits 
What is most intriguing abount transfers of the benefits of the AAA 
is not that they can occur but that Congress intended that they should 
occur. 75 It is instructive to examine why that is. 
As in any sale of property, the seller of stock in an S corporation off-
sets his basis against the proceeds of sale in determining his gain or 
loss. Since that basis will have been increased by the amount of income 
of the S corporation taxed to him, the seller receives tax free the same 
amount that he could have received as a first tier distribution from the 
corporation. The seller is made whole by the basis offset and, as far 
as we have explored, does not need to be able to transfer his interest 
in the AAA. Nor, at first glance, does it appear that the purchaser needs 
the benefits of the seller's interest in the AAA. The purchaser will have 
a basis equal to the amount paid for the stock, presumably the entire 
value of his interest, and is not entitled to any greater tax-free receipt. 
Unfortunately, having a basis in an S corporation that has earnings 
and profits is not enough to protect the shareholder from tax on distribu-
tions. Under the distribution priorities, unless the distribution is of S 
income, it is of earnings and profits. Thus, unless the purchaser obtained 
a right to a distribution of AAA, the distribution to him will be fully 
taxable. That result would be unjust to both parties. If the seller is not 
able to transfer his right to receive first tier distributions, the value of his 
stock will be impaired. In addition, taxing a new purchaser on a distri-
bution of earnings and profits while the old shareholders are receiving 
tax-free distributions is illogical because the earnings and profits are less 
attributable to him than to the old shareholders. Congress' solution to 
that potential irrationality was to permit new shareholders to participate 
in first tier distributions on the same basis as could the old shareholders. 
New shareholders could have been protected against untimely second 
tier distributions without the adoption of a corporate level account. 
Transferable shareholder level accounts would have had the same effect. 
Under that approach, however, the level of the purchaser's entitlement 
to a tax-free distribution would depend on the fortuity of the size of the 
seller's account. One reason for the adoption of the corporate level AAA 
was to eliminate that inappropriate result. 
Brief reflection on this analysis suggests that the fundamental problem 
concerns not the transferability of an interest in the AAA but rather the 
treatment of earnings and profits. It does not make any sense to tax the 
purchaser on earnings and profits while the other shareholders are receiv-
ing tax-free distributions; it makes no sense to tax a post-1982 purchaser 
75 S. REP. No. 640, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1982), reprinted in 1982-2 C.B. 
718, 727. 
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of stock in an S corporation on earnings and profits at all. That account 
is carried over from prior years to prevent tax avoidance by the persons 
who were shareholders during nonelecting years, and has no proper 
relationship to persons becoming shareholders after subchapter S dis-
pensed with that concept. 76 Nevertheless, consistent with the separate 
entity concepts that control the regular corporate tax, the earnings and 
profits account of an S corporation is a corporate level account that may 
be attributed to, and taxed to, shareholders investing in the corporation 
in years after the account was generated. Because of that treatment of 
the earnings and profits account, it became desirable to make the sub-
chapter S income account a corporate level account. Thus, a flaw was 
introduced into subchapter S to negate the effect of a more fundamental 
flaw. 
It has not yet been demonstrated that it is possible to design a satisfac-
tory system for the taxation of business organizations that combines sub-
stantial elements of both conduit and entity taxation. Concern over the 
potential for manipulation has led to unreasonably rigid definitional and 
procedural requirements for S corporations. 77 The second attempt at 
developing a system for taxing distributions is fundamentally inferior to 
its predecessor. Those operational defects suggest that corporations hav-
ing earnings and profits should not be permitted to elect under subchapter 
S without first purging themselves of that account, either through distri-
butions or the payment of an appropriate tax. 
That practical conclusion is strongly supported by principle. The 
failure to impose any tax with respect to the earnings and profits of an 
electing corporation is an unjustifiable concession. While the election 
does not produce an increase in a shareholder's basis,'"' following the 
election the shareholders obtain the benefit of the corporation's tax basis 
for its assets in the computation of their individual tax liabilities. Con-
trary to the virtually universal application of the taxing system, •u that 
step-up in basis is not accompanied by the imposition of tax. Accord-
76 Before the 1982 revision, S corporations could accumulate earnings and 
profits. The rules of § 312 governing earnings and profits computations differ 
from the rules governing the computation of taxable income; only the latter was 
constructively distributed to shareholders. That flaw in the taxation of S corpora-
tions was removed in 1982, but the pre-1983 account was preserved. Since the 
distribution provisions do not distinguish between S period and C period earnings 
and profits, a corporation that has never been a nonelecting corporation can be 
subject to the more complex distribution rules. That result is questionable. 
77 See Coven, supra note 67, at 271. 
78 Because of the basis limitation, the shareholders may not obtain net losses 
attributable to the higher corporate basis. The income of the S corporation, how-
ever, is sheltered by deductions or other allowances generated by the higher basis. 
79 The glaring exception is the tax-free step-up in basis obtained on death 
under § 1014. 
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ingly, the shareholders of a newly electing corporation obtain a tax 
subsidy that is not warranted by any apparent principle of tax policy. 
This perception has led some commentators to suggest that a compensat-
ing tax should be imposed upon any corporation having earnings and 
profits that elects subchapter S. During the 1982 revision, Professor 
Ginsburg, for example, argued that a tax at capital gains rates should be 
imposed upon the amount of the net increase in basis. 80 
Principles of tax neutrality might suggest an even greater tax. For an 
existing C corporation to transform itself into the other form of conduit 
business entity, a partnership, the corporation must liquidate, subjecting 
both itself and its shareholders to tax. The traditional pattern of taxing 
liquidations extends to the parties a choice between capital gains taxation 
on the entire appreciation in value of the corporation, whether or not 
realized at the corporate level, or ordinary income taxation upon the 
entire earnings and profits of the corporation. 81 If that tax cost must 
be incurred in moving to the partnership form, considerations of neu-
trality suggest that a similar tax be imposed upon the election of 
subchapter S. Thus, the election might be treated as a constructive liqui-
dation at the shareholder level. 82 
While the case for the imposition of a tax along one or another of 
these lines is strong, Congress to date has preferred to permit free entry 
to the benefits of subchapter S. Assuming that this policy will persist, 
and thus that subchapter S will not extend true conduit taxation, it is 
nevertheless possible to improve considerably the operation of its pro-
visions. 
E. Shareholder Level Accounting 
The use of the corporate level AAA to distinguish between earnings 
and profits and S income is not satisfactory. Accumulated subchapter S 
income is not like earnings and profits; it is in fact attributable to 
individual shareholders and rationally belongs in shareholder level 
accounts. In this respect, the approach of the prior version of subchapter 
S was much to be preferred. The 1982 experiment has failed and sub-
chapter S should be returned to the shareholder level accounts used 
80 Ginsburg, Subchapter S and Accumulated E & P: A Different View, 17 
TAX NOTES 571 (1982). 
81 Compare § 331 with former § 333. 
82 On an actual pre--1987 liquidation, some tax is incurred at the corporate 
level under various statutory and case law principles. See I.R.C. § 1245; Hills-
boro Nat'! Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370 (1983). There would be no 
reason to impose any such tax liability upon a constructive liquidation because 
the corporation would in fact continue and the basis of its assets would be un-
changed. 
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under prior law. However, because of other changes in subchapter S, 
including the elimination of current earnings and profits 83 and the im-
position of tax on the distribution of appreciated property,84 a share-
holder level account need no longer be subject to the unfortunate 
restrictions of prior law. 
It is ·not just the corporate level AAA that is inconsistent with the 
conduit taxation of S corporations; a corporate level earnings and profits 
account is equally inappropriate and, in fact, was a contributing factor 
in the development of the corporate level AAA. The rationality of sub-
chapter S would be greatly enhanced if the accounting for earnings and 
profits were consistent with the principles of conduit taxation rather than 
those of entity taxation. Upon an S election, the earnings and profits 
account should be converted into individual shareholder level accounts 
by allocating the balance in the account among the shareholders in pro-
portion to their stock ownership. 
While individual, shareholder level earnings and profits accounts 
would constitute a striking deviation from the principles of entity taxa-
tion, they would be entirely consistent with the conduit system of 
taxation that subchapter S was intended to implement. Moreover, the 
conversion of earnings and profits to shareholder level accounts would 
permit taxing the undistributed pre-election-period earnings of the cor-
poration to the shareholders who benefited from the tax deferral that 
entity taxation extends, rather than to shareholders who invested in a 
conduit entity. Since in principle it would be entirely appropriate 
to impose a tax with respect to those earnings and profits upon the share-
holders of the corporation on the date of its election, it is equally 
appropriate to limit the future taxation of those earnings and profits to 
that same body of shareholders. 
Shareholder level S income and earnings and profits accounts would 
operate simply and efficiently. The net increases in a shareholder's basis 
after the effective date of the amendment would be reflected in an 
account much like the previously taxed income account used under prior 
law. Ordinary distributions not in excess of the balance in that account 
would not be subject to tax, as under current Jaw. Distributions in 
excess of the account would be taxed as ordinary dividends to the extent 
of the shareholder level earnings and profits-again, very much as under 
present law, although using a different measuring rod. Further distribu-
tions would be taxed precisely as under present law. Upon a termination 
of the S election, the process would be reversed. The aggregate of the 
83 The only problem of prior law that the corporate level account addresses is 
transferability. Thus, a return to shareholder level accounts would not reopen 
any other prior law problem that was resolved in 1982. 
84 I.R.C. § 1363(d). 
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remaining shareholder level earnings and profits accounts would become 
the corporate level account of the nonelecting corporation. 
The rationality of the distinction that must be drawn between earnings 
and profits and S income would be greatly improved by such a system. 
Shareholder level accounts would prevent the shifting of the benefits or 
burdens of either accumulated S income or earnings and profits among 
existing or new shareholders. And, the illogical gap that existing law 
inserts between first and second tier distributions would be eliminated. 
Admittedly, the adoption of shareholder level earnings and profits 
accounts would require addressing one of the more complex issues in 
corporation taxation. Since one of the primary purposes for the share-
holder level account would be to prevent taxing earnings and profits to 
new shareholders, the account could not be transferable. Thus, the tax 
liability inherent in the account must be settled at the time of any stock 
transfer. Configuring that settlement would require determining the 
extent to which an ordinary income tax should be imposed upon a 
gain realized upon the sale or redemption of stock in an S corporation 
and what exceptions to that tax should be made. Unless an amount equal 
to the remaining balance in the earnings and profits account were taxed 
at ordinary rates upon a disposition, the deferred tax could be avoided. 
On the other hand, precisely that result has traditionally been tolerated 
on stock redemptions from nonelecting corporations and perhaps the 
rule of subchapter S should not be harsher. 85 And, if at least certain 
redemptions are not to trigger the ordinary tax, perhaps certain stock 
sales should not either. In 1982, doubt over the proper resolution of 
these questions would have hampered the adoption of shareholder level 
accounts. 
The acceptability of shareholder level accounts, however, has been 
greatly facilitated by the elimination of the highly preferential rate of 
tax on capital gains. 86 As long as essentially the same rate of tax is 
imposed upon ordinary income and capital gains, there is little practical 
significance of the resolution of those theoretically complex questions. 
Since recharacterizing a portion of the gain on a sale as ordinary income 
would not significantly alter the income tax consequences of the trans-
action, doubt concerning the propriety of the recharacterization cannot 
85 At th:e corporate level, a redemption is treated as a distribution of earnings 
and profits even though, at the shareholder level, the transaction is taxed as a 
sale. See I.R.C. § 312(n) (7). 
S6The Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 301(a), 100 Stat. 
2085, repealed the exclusion from tax of 60% of a capital gain previously ex-
tended by § 1202. However, § 302(a) of the Act added a new § 1 (j) which 
limits the maximum rate of tax on a capital gain to 28%. Thus, capital gains 
will continue to be taxed at a lower rate of tax than other income during the 
transition phase-in of the new rate schedules. 
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be an obstacle to the adoption of shareholder level earnings and profits 
accounts. As it has throughout the Code, that 1986 reform greatly 
facilities improving the rationality of subchapter S. 
Regardless of the extent of the preference to which capital gains in-
come is presently, or may in the future, be entitled, the outlines of the 
appropriate pattern for taxing dispositions of S corporation stock en-
cumbered by a shareholder level earnings and profits account may readily 
be perceived. A similar problem is addressed by section 306 which 
contains a mechanism for preventing the avoidance of a deferred ordi-
nary tax attributable to earnings and profits on the disposition of stock."' 
The stock in an S corporation having earnings and profits might be 
tainted in a manner similar to the operation of section 306 and, pre-
sumably, with similar exceptions. Thus, in general, on a sale or redemp-
tion of S corporation stock, ordinary income would be realized to the 
full extent of the remaining balance in the earnings and profits account 
unless the disposition amounted to a complete termination of interest 
in the corporation. 
The result of such a taint, of course, would be that the shareholders 
in a corporation that elected under subchapter S could be subject to a 
higher rate of tax on the disposition of their stock than if S corporation 
status had not been elected. That tax, however, merely compensates for 
the deferral of the tax that could have been imposed at the time of mak-
ing the election and thus would be entirely proper. Moreover, if the 
shareholders had an opportunity to purge the earnings and profits of the 
corporation at the time of election through the payment of a tax imposed 
at capital gains rates, it would seem entirely appropriate for the deferred 
tax to be imposed at the higher ordinary rate. 88 
m. PuRGING EARNINGS AND PROFITS: CARROTS AND STICKS 
While the adoption of shareholder level S income and earnings and 
profits accounts would greatly improve subchapter S, as would permitting 
87 In general, § 306 taxes the gain on the disposition of preferred stock re-
ceived as a dividend at ordinary income rates. The provision contains exceptions 
to this treatment that roughly correspond to the § 302(b) tests for sales treatment. 
88 The consequences of stock transfers by gift or in other carryover basis trans-
fers could be resolved in either of two ways. Properly, the amount of the earn-
ings and profits account should be taxed to the donor, who had benefited from 
the deferral of tax, at the time of transfer. Nevertheless, the policy of not recog-
nizing gain on a gift is strong. As under § 306(c) (1 )(C), the ordinary income 
taint could carry over with the stock basis. 
Partial sales, of course, present further problems but, as in the case of gifts, 
the problems are of a practical, not a substantive, nature. Under § 306, the taint 
attaches on a per share basis; the sale of a fraction of the stock involved results 
in ordinary income taxation on a similar fraction of the earnings and profits on 
the relevant date. 
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a basis adjustment for corporate level borrowings, conduit level taxation 
would work best if all continuing elements of the taxation of C corpora-
tions were eliminated. That would require the complete purging of the 
earnings and profits account which Congress has been unwilling to do 
on a mandatory basis. There is no reason, however, to penalize S 
corporations without earnings and profits because other S corporations 
have earnings and profits. 
In the 1982 revision of the distribution rules, Congress undertook to 
create a simplified set of rules governing corporations having no earnings 
and profits. 89 Nevertheless, in this and other areas of subchapter S, 
corporations that lack earnings and profits are penalized by rules de-
signed to govern corporations that possess such an account. While the 
AAA, for example, is only relevant to S corporations with earnings and 
profits, the instructions to the S corporation information return require 
all S corporations to maintain such an account, perhaps because the 
account may become relevant upon the termination of the S election. 00 
In addition, it has been argued elsewhere 01 that Congress should be 
more willing to relax the excessively rigid definitional and procedural 
requirements for S corporations that do not have and could not obtain 
earnings and profits. For such a corporation, there is no justification for 
imposing more restrictive procedural or substantive rules than are ap-
plicable to partnerships. 
On the other hand, the availability of a liberalized version of sub-
chapter S for corporations lacking earnings and profits could allow more 
stringent treatment of corporations that have earnings and profits. For 
example, the odd compromise that led to the safe harbor debt provisions 
is most difficult to apply to corporations having earnings and profits.02 
A dual subchapter S would permit the repeal of that dispensation for 
corporations having earnings and profits, and might also permit eliminat-
ing the one class of stock requirement for corporations without earnings 
and profits. 
89 I.R.C. § 1368(b); see also I.R.C. § 1375(a)(l) (tax on passive income 
only applies if corporation has C period earnings and profits). 
90 Under § 1371(e), certain distributions of cash following the termination of 
an S election are treated as tax-free returns of capital rather than ordinary divi-
dends. However, that relief is only available for distributions that do not exceed 
the AAA. It is ironic that the AAA is relevant to an S corporation lacking earn-
ings and profits only when it is no longer an S corporation. 
9 1 Coven, supra note 67, at 271. 
02 Under § 1361(c)(5), so-called safe harbor debt that would be treated as 
stock under general recharacterization principles cannot be treated as a second 
class of stock that would terminate the S election. The extent to which such 
debt may be treated as stock for other purposes is unresolved. However, the 
Treasury Department is unlikely to permit safe harbor debt to be used to avoid 
dividend treatment of corporate distributions. 
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If such a dual system were coupled with a reasonable mechanism for 
purging earnings and profits, many S corporations might choose to volun-
tarily subject themselves to tax in order to take advantage of the 
liberalized version. The problem of S corporations with earnings a_nd 
profits might thus correct itself. In this context, the imposition of a 
tax along the lines of Professor Ginsburg's suggestion becomes appeal-
ing. A tax at capital gains rates on an amount equal to the earnings and 
profits of the corporation, accompanied by an equal increase in the bases 
of the shareholders' stock, might be viewed as an accelerated realization 
of a portion of the gain that would be realized upon liquidation. While 
a greater levy might well be justified in principle, the more limited tax 
would result in a deferral of tax on the unrealized gain in the corporate 
assets-not an unreasonable result. 
Two categories of S corporations, then, could be created in order to 
accomplish the desired compromise of permitting tax-free entry into sub-
chapter S while having a viable system of conduit taxation. Corporations 
with no earnings and profits that could not obtain earnings and profits 
because they could not engage in carryover basis transactions with C 
corporations would be subject to a substantively rationalized and pro-
cedurally simplified form of conduit taxation. Ideally, such a corpora-
tion could be taxed almost exactly as is a partnership and, after a quarter 
of a century, subchapter S might live up to its press releases. On the 
other hand, corporations that had earnings and profits and did not choose 
to eliminate that account through the payment of whatever toll charge 
might be deemed appropriate, would remain subject to a version of 
subchapter S, much like present law, that was designed to prevent 
manipulative abuses. The added complexity of two versions of subchap-
ter S would be more than offset by the simplification that could be 
extended to both versions. 
IV. AND THEN THERE wAS 1986 
After repeatedly narrowing its scope, Congress determined in 1986 
to repeal completely the so-called General Utilities doctrine.03 Subject 
to the usual pesky transitional rules,04 after 1986, appreciation in the 
value of corporate assets is subject to the corporate income tax when the 
assets are distributed from corporate solution or obtain a step-up in 
basis while remaining in corporate solution. To execute that reversal of 
policy, Congress repealed section 337 (which had exempted gains on 
93 General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935). 
Under the doctrine that has become associated with this case, corporations recog-
nize no gain or loss on a distribution of property with respect to stock. 
94 See Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 633(d), 100 Stat. 2085. 
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sales of corporate assets incident to a taxable liquidation), reversed the 
rule of section 336 to impose a tax on the appreciation inherent in 
property distributed in a liquidation, and eliminated the portions of 
section 311 that had previously barred the imposition of a similar tax 
on some nonliquidating distributions of appreciated property. 
The rigor with which the General Utilities doctrine was eradicated 
resulted in an unnecessarily harsh treatment of taxable asset acquisitions. 
When assets remain in corporate solution, the policy underlying the re-
peal only requires a corporate level tax if the assets are given a fair 
market value basis.95 When a business is transferred by one corporation 
to another and the tax basis of the assets carries over to the acquiring 
corporation, it is unnecessary, indeed improper, to impose a corporate 
level tax on the asset transfer because the corporate level tax will be 
imposed upon a subsequent disposition of the acquired assets by the 
acquiring corporation. It might have been preferable for Congress to 
have permitted the transferor in an asset acquisition to continue to escape 
the corporate level tax if the acquiring corporation elects to carry over 
the basis of the acquired assets. 96 Precisely that flexibility is deliberately 
extended to taxable stock acquisitions. Pursuant to section 338, a cor-
poration acquiring the stock of another has an election to either retain 
the tax attributes, including basis, of the assets of the acquired corpora-
tion or to obtain a step-up in the basis of those assets at the cost of a 
corporate level tax on the gain inherent in the assets of the acquired 
corporation. 97 
A. Subchapter Sand the Repeal of General Utilities 
The repeal of the General Utilities doctrine required some modification 
of subchapter S. Previously, the corporate level tax was usually excused 
on income and gain realized after the making of the election. Absent 
extended to taxable stock acquisitions. Pursuant to section 338, a cor-
some amendment, a subchapter S election would have become an avenue 
for avoiding corporate level tax on the gain inherent in the electing 
corporation's assets at the time of election-avoiding, that is, the burden 
of the General Utilities repeal. The logic of the repeal, coupled with the 
lack of a carryover basis election in asset acquisitions, might suggest that 
at the time of the making of a subchapter S election, a corporate level 
95 See ALI, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT, SUBCHAPTER C (1982). 
9 6 Elective treatment was proposed by the ALI and by the 1985 proposals of 
the Staff of the Senate Finance Committee. See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON 
FINANCE, 99TH CoNG., 1ST SESS., THE SUBCHAPTER C REVISION AcT OF 1985 
(Comm. Print 1985). 
97 I.R.C. § 338(a); see also Temp. Reg.§ 1.338-4T(f)(6). 
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tax should be imposed upon the entire gain inherent in the assets of the 
electing corporation. Because the election effectively removes the assets 
from the reach of the corporate income tax, the making of the election 
could have been treated at the corporate level as a constructive distribu-
tion of all the assets of the corporation, even though it is not a taxable 
transaction at the shareholder level. 
Such a tax, however, would offend the longstanding congressional 
policy of facilitating S elections by not imposing any significant tax bur-
den upon the making of an election.98 As a result, the entirely logical, but 
harsh, extension of the repeal of General Utilities was apparently not 
seriously considered. 
Rather, Congress adopted a carryover basis solution for former C 
corporations; 99 no corporate tax is imposed at the time of election, and 
the basis of corporate assets carries over to the S corporation successor. 
A corporate tax is imposed, however, when the S corporation disposes of 
the assets it inherited from its C corporation predecessor. 
Deferral of the corporate level tax, while not entirely consistent with 
the amendments to sections 336 and 337, is nonetheless entirely sound. 
The repeal of the General Utilities doctrine does not require imposition 
of a corporate tax when assets do not obtain a step-up in basis and 
remain subject to the corporate level income tax. A deferred corporate 
tax is consistent with section 338, and results in an adequate burden of 
taxation. 
The implementation of the carryover basis concept adopted by Con-
gress, however, is flawed. The deferral of the corporate tax on built-in 
gain required a blending of C corporation and S corporation concepts, 
which, as has uniformly been the case, was not successfully accomplished. 
B. The Ideal Consequence of the Repeal 
While Congress did not treat the making of a subchapter S election as 
a liquidation at the corporate level, the carryover basis alternative used 
instead merely defers the imposition of the corporate level tax, and 
thus should produce consequences that are compatible with the imposi-
tion of tax at the time of the making of the election. Since the gain 
inherent in the assets of a corporation contemplating an S election is a 
C corporation attribute, an immediate tax on the appreciation in those 
assets would be regarded as imposed an instant before the S election 
becomes effective.100 As under a section 338 election, a step up of the 
basis of corporate assets to fair market value would be a necessary 
98 See supra text accompanying note 9. 
99 I.R.C. § 1374. 
too Compare I.R.C. § 338(a). 
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corollary of the tax. The tax would have no effect on the shareholders 
of the electing corporation; the basis for their stock would not be altered. 
The income recognized at the corporate level, however, would result in 
an increase in the C corporation's earnings and profits, which, under the 
existing pattern of taxing S corporations, would carry over to the S 
corporation. 
There would be two salutary consequences of this treatment. First, C 
corporation and S corporation tax concepts would be integrated as under 
the existing statutory pattern. As described above, 101 the C corporation 
history carries over to the S corporation through the continuation of the 
earnings and profits account. The potential double taxation that the 
earnings and profits account represents is realized only when the S cor-
poration makes distributions traceable to that account. Had Congress 
implemented the General Utilities repeal by treating a C corporation's 
S election as a constructive liquidation, the double tax burden imposed 
on gain built in at the time of election would have been treated like any 
other income or gain realized before the election. 
Second, under such a pattern of taxation, the shareholder level tax 
would be imposed upon the increase in the value of corporate assets in 
the same manner as that tax is imposed upon nonelecting C corporations. 
Thus, if the S corporation made distributions in excess of the income 
accumulated after the making of the election (that is, distributions in 
excess of the accumulated adjustments account), the excess would be 
taxable as an ordinary dividend. If the shareholders realized the appre-
ciation through a disposition of their stock, in contrast, they would be 
taxed on the disposition because the corporate level tax would not have 
been reflected in the basis of their stock. Similarly, C corporation share-
holders are not taxed until appreciation in the value of the corporation 
is realized by either a distribution or a sale. 
C. Actual Consequences of Repeal 
The 1986 amendments to subchapter S that were designed to curb 
avoidance of the General Utilities repeal instead produced very different 
results. Under amended section 1374, when an S corporation disposes 
of any asset held on the date of its S election, gain is taxed to the cor-
poration to the extent of the gain inherent in the asset when the election 
took effect. That much is entirely consistent with the carryover basis 
approach to the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine. 
The deferred gain and the corporate tax on it, however, were not made 
part of the C corporation history of the S corporation. Instead, in apply-
ing the regular regime for taxing current income of an S corporation, the 
101 See supra text accompanying notes 10-13, 49-50. 
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gain is also included in shareholder gross income. 102 Since the sharehold-
ers of S corporations are taxed on income recognized at the corporate 
level without regard to actual distributions, the pattern of taxation 
adopted under section 1374 imposes immediate double taxation on the 
built-in gain even though no recognition event occurs at the shareholder 
level. 
This imposition of double taxation without regard to actual distribu-
tions is inconsistent with the pattern of taxing either S corporations or 
C corporations, and is substantially harsher than either pattern. Share-
holders of an S corporation are taxed on corporate income whether or 
not distributed-but only once. Income of C corporations is subject to 
two levels of taxation-but the second is imposed only when distribu-
tions are received or stock is sold. Only shareholders of S corporations 
that have built-in gains are subject to two levels of taxation without 
regard to distributions or stock sales. As a result, section 1374 creates a 
new and inexplicably harsh pattern of taxation. 
This novel pattern of taxation has created a highly undesirable dis-
continuity between the taxation of C corporation gain recognized before 
and after the making of an S election. The sale of an asset immediately 
prior to the election results in the usual corporate level tax, and an in-
crease in earnings and profits, which, in turn, will be taxed to sharehold-
ers when distributed from that account. A sale of the asset immediately 
after the election, however, results in instantaneous double taxation. 
Such a discontinuity is inconsistent with the policy underlying the Gen-
eral Utilities repeal of eliminating radically different burdens of taxation 
upon continuing and liquidating corporations. 
Moreover, the approach of section 1374 is undesirable because it 
creates a second method for integrating C period and S period tax at-
tributes. Prior to 1987, C period accumulated income was taxed to the 
S corporation shareholders through the distribution priorities of section 
1368. The 1986 changes continue that pattern for income and gain 
recognized before the election, but income and gain that is recognized 
after the S election but is attributable to C period activities is taxed very 
differently under section 1374. Since section 1368 is itself defective. 
the addition of a second-and more defective-integration technique 
has materially impaired the integrity and usefulness of subchapter S. 
D. Proposed Revision of Section 1374 
The mechanism for preventing avoidance of the General Utilities re-
peal through S elections is inappropriate, particularly because an appro-
102 Under § 1366(f)(2}, the gain taxable to shareholders is reduced by the 
amount of the tax paid by the corporation. 
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priate mechanism is not difficult to conceive. Gain inherent in property 
inherited by an S corporation from a C corporation should be taxed at 
the corporate level when recognized, as it now is under section 1374. 
There is no justification, however, for immediately subjecting the gain to 
a second tax in the normal operation of subchapter S. Rather, ( 1) the 
gain, reduced by the corporate tax on it, should be added to earnings 
and profits, and (2) neither the AAA nor the shareholders' basis for 
their stock should be adjusted for the gain or the tax. This procedure 
would delay the shareholder level tax until the gain is distributed or 
stock is sold. 
Such a pattern of taxation would eliminate the existing defects of 
section 1374. Pre- and post-election gain would be taxed alike, and in 
a manner consistent with both the pattern of taxing C corporations and 
the integration of C corporation and S corporation tax concepts previ-
ously accomplished under subchapter S. The excessive harshness of 
section 13 7 4 would be eliminated. 
Section 1374 was hurriedly drafted by the conference committee on 
the 1986 Act, 103 and is inconsistent with all preceding legislative propos-
als. The House bill, which proposed the repeal of the General Utilities 
doctrine, would have imposed double taxation upon S corporations that 
had converted from C corporation status only if the corporation were 
liquidated within three years after the S election took effect. 104 Even 
that measure of double taxation, however, was accomplished through a 
retroactive termination of the S election, thereby imposing a shareholder 
tax, if at all, only under the rules for C corporations. The Senate con-
tribution to the 1986 legislation did not contain the House's repeal of 
General Utilities. In the preceding year, however, the Staff of the Senate 
Finance Committee had proposed a revision of subchapter C which 
included repeal of the General Utilities doctrine. Under the Staff's pro-
posal, double taxation of gain inherent in the assets of a C corporation 
predecessor was accomplished through the computation of the sharehold-
er's basis for his stock. 105 In general, the proposed bill would have denied 
an increase in the basis of S stock for the after-tax income or gain recog-
nized by an S corporation attributable to pre-election appreciation. 
Accordingly, a second level tax would only have been imposed with 
respect to such a gain when the S corporation made distributions to share-
holders in excess of the basis for their stock. 
l03 H.R. REP. No. 841, 99TH CoNG., 2o SEss. Il-203 (Conf. Rep. 1986). 
104 H.R. 3838, 99TH CONG., 1ST SEss. § 334 (1985). 
105 STAFF OF SENATE CoMM. oN FINANCE, 99TH CoNG., 1sT SEss., THE Sun-
CHAPTER C REVISION AcT OF 1985, at 181-86 (Comm. Print 1985) (proposed 
amendment to § 1367). -
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Neither of these proposals may have been sufficiently rigorous. Never-
theless, the general concept underlying each proposal-that a second tax 
should not be imposed absent a distribution or stock disposition-was 
sound and inconsistent with the solution adopted by the conference 
committee. · 
If subchapter S were not otherwise amended, as it has been argued 
above that it should be, the revision of section 1374 suggested here 
could be implemented with no technical difficulties. Gain attributable to 
pre-election appreciation in corporate property as currently measured 
under section 1374, less the tax attributable thereto, would increase the 
corporation's earnings and profits as that gain was recognized. To that 
extent, the gain would not be included in the income otherwise allocable 
to the shareholders, and thus would not affect the basis of the stock. 
These changes, however, would greatly aggravate the problem of dis-
criminating between distributions of earnings and profits, on the one 
hand, and income recognized under the Selection, on the other. If recog-
nized built-in gains increased earnings and profits rather than the AAA, 
it would become far more likely that distributions would exceed the 
first tier allowance and be characterized as second tier distributions of 
earnings and profits. Accordingly, if section 1374 were rationalized, it 
would become more important than at present to rationalize the section 
1368 treatment of subchapter S distributions. 
Amending section 1374 would not complicate the conversion of the 
present corporate level AAA to individual shareholder level accounts. 
The carryover basis approach of section 1374, however, does complicate 
the conversion of earnings and profits to shareholder level accounts. The 
additions to earnings and profits presently in question would be recog-
nized subsequent to the making of the S election. Had a corporate level 
tax been imposed when the S election took effect, the increase in earnings 
and profits would have been allocated among shareholders on that date. 
That result would be proper because the increase is attributable to gain 
inherent in the corporate assets at the time the election was made. Argu-
ably, the deferral of the corporate tax through the carryover basis should 
not alter the earnings and profits allocation. Further, allocating earnings 
and profits to post-election shareholders would appear inconsistent with 
the purposes for shareholder level earnings and profits accounts. One 
of the principal reasons for shareholder level accounts is to prevent the 
allocation of pre-election earnings and profits to individuals who became 
shareholders after the S election is made. 
Nevertheless, since the carryover basis that survives the election can 
defer the corporate level tax for several years, it becomes a practical im-
possibility to allocate the earnings and profits generated by the imposi-
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tion of that tax to shareholders on the date of the making of the election. 
Rather, the earnings and profits must be added to, or perhaps create, 
shareholder level accounts of shareholders on the date that the earnings 
and profits are recognized. That allocation would not achieve theoretical 
perfection. The present corporate level earnings and profits account, 
however, supports dividend treatment of distributions to shareholders 
investing in the corporation after an S election becomes effective, and an 
allocation of earnings and profits from built-in gains to individual ac-
counts of those same shareholders is, at least, no worse. 
As suggested above with respect to the elimination of earnings and 
profits accounts in general, 106 at a very minimum, an election should be 
provided permitting an S corporation to purge its C corporation tax at-
tributes and thereby become subject to an improved pattern of taxing S 
corporations. In the present context, that approach requires permitting 
a corporation making an S election to further elect to pay a corporate 
level tax on the appreciation in its properties, 107 and step-up the assets' 
bases to fair market value. Corporations so electing would be freed 
from section 1374, whatever forin it might assume. Shareholders of 
corporations that do not utilize this election, but instead retain a carry-
over basis for the S corporation assets, would remain subject to a deferred 
corporate level tax and the complexities and theoretical imperfections 
that such a tax entails. It is to be hoped, however, that the imperfec-
tions do not include the punitive double tax contained in the present 
version of section 1374. 
V. CoNCLUSION 
Because the 1986 Act makes the highest marginal tax rate for C cor-
porations materially higher than the maximum rate applicable to indi-
vidual taxpayers (including S shareholders), the usage of subchapter S 
by corporations having earnings and profits will inevitably increase sub-
stantially. It thus becomes correspondingly more important to develop 
a rational approach to the taxation of such corporations and their share-
holders. It has been demonstated here that the continuing use of entity 
based concepts within subchapter S impairs the rationality of its pro-
10a See supra text accompanying notes 89-93. 
1°7 Since the shareholders of an S corporation obtain no tax benefit from a 
step-up in the basis of goodwill and similar intangibles, it seems unnecessary to 
require that a corporate level tax be paid on the appreciation in value of such 
nondepreciable intangibles. In fact, unless that element of gain were exempt from 
an immediate tax, the election to accelerate that tax would rarely be feasible. 
Compare ALI, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT, SUBCHAPTER C, PROPOSAL C2, 
at 120-26 (1982). 
1987] SUBCHAPTER S DISTRIBUTIONS 417 
visions and increases their complexity. At the very least, those provisions 
should be replaced with concepts that are compatible with a conduit 
system of taxation. Ultimately, however, the development of a true con-
duit corporate tax will require the complete insulation of the S corpora-
tion from its C corporation history on either a mandatory or voluntary 
basis. 
